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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal timing to liquidate defaultable securities in a general
intensity-based credit risk model under stochastic interest rate. We incorporate the poten-
tial price discrepancy between the market and investors, which is characterized by risk-neutral
valuation under dierent default risk premia specications. To quantify the value of optimally
timing to sell, we introduce the delayed liquidation premium which is closely related to the
stochastic bracket between the market price and a pricing kernel. We analyze the optimal
liquidation policy for various credit derivatives. Our model serves as the building block for
the sequential buying and selling problem. We also discuss the extensions to a jump-diusion
default intensity model as well as a defaultable equity model.
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1 Introduction
In credit derivatives trading, one important question is how the market compensates investors for
bearing credit risk. A number of studies [2, 4, 9, 18] have examined analytically and empirically
the structure of default risk premia inferred from the market prices of corporate bonds, credit
default swaps, and multi-name credit derivatives. A major risk premium component is the mark-
to-market risk premium which accounts for the uctuations in default risk. Under reduced-form
models of credit risk [12, 19, 22], this is connected with a drift change of the state variable diusion
driving the default intensity. In addition, there is the event risk premium (or jump-to-default risk
premium) that compensates for the uncertain timing of the default event, and is measured by the
ratio of the risk-neutral intensity to the historical intensity (see [2, 18]).
From standard no-arbitrage pricing theory, risk premia specication is inherently tied to the
selection of risk-neutral pricing measures. A typical buy-side investor (e.g. hedge fund manager
or proprietary trader) would identify trading opportunities by looking for mispriced contracts in
the market. This can be interpreted as selecting a pricing measure to reect her view on credit
risk evolution and the required risk premia. As a result, the investor's pricing measure may dier
from that represented by the prevailing market prices. In a related study, Leung and Ludkovski
[23] showed that such a price discrepancy would also arise from pricing under marginal utility.
Price discrepancy is also important for investors with credit-sensitive positions who may need
to control risk exposure through liquidation. The central issue lies in the timing of liquidation
as investors have the option to sell at the current market price or wait for a later opportunity.
The optimal strategy, as we will study, depends on the sources of risks, risk premia, as well as
derivative payos.
This paper tackles the optimal liquidation problem on two fronts. First, we provide a math-
ematical framework for price discrepancy between the market and investors under an intensity-
based credit risk model. Second, we derive and analyze the optimal stopping problem correspond-
ing to the liquidation of defaultable securities under price discrepancy. As a natural extension,
we also examine the optimal buy-and-sell strategy and the associated optimal double-stopping
problem.
In order to measure the benet of optimally timing to sell as opposed to immediate liquidation,
we employ the concept of delayed liquidation premium. It turns out to be a very useful tool for
analyzing the optimal stopping problem. The intuition is that the investor should wait as long as
the delayed liquidation premium is strictly positive. Applying martingale arguments, we deduce
the scenarios where immediate or delayed liquidation is optimal (see Theorem 3.4). Moreover,
through its probabilistic representation, the delayed liquidation premium reveals the roles of risk
premia in the liquidation timing. Under a Markovian credit risk model, the optimal timing
is characterized by a liquidation boundary solved from a variational inequality. For numerical
illustration, we provide a series of examples where the default intensity and interest rate follow
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) processes.
Our study also provides a connection between dierent risk-neutral pricing measures (or equiv-
alent martingale measures) in incomplete markets. Well-known examples of candidate pricing
measures that are consistent with the no-arbitrage principle include the minimal martingale mea-
sure [14], the minimal entropy martingale measure [15, 16], and the q-optimal martingale measure
[17]. For CDO tranche spreads, Cont and Minca [7] constructed a pricing measure and default
intensity based on entropy minimization. In this paper, we examine how the choice of pricing
measure will inuence the investor's liquidation timing.
In recent literature, a number of models have been proposed to incorporate the idea of mispric-
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ing into optimal investment. Cornell et al. [8] studied portfolio optimization based on perceived
mispricing from the investor's strong belief in the stock price distribution. Ekstrom et al. [13]
investigated the optimal liquidation of a call spread when the investor's belief on the volatility
diers from the implied volatility. Our work is closest in spirit to [24] where the delayed purchase
premium concept was used to analyze the optimal timing to buy European and American options
under price discrepancy. On the other hand, the problem of optimal liquidation involving price
impacts has been studied in [1, 26, 27], among others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the mathematical model
for price discrepancy and formulate the optimal liquidation problem under a general intensity-
based credit risk model. In Section 3, we study the problem within a Markovian market and
characterize the optimal liquidation strategy for a general defaultable claim. In Section 4, we
apply our analysis to a number of credit derivatives, e.g. defaultable bonds and credit default
swaps (CDS). In Section 5, we examine the optimal buy-and-sell strategy for defaultable claims.
Section 6 summarizes several extensions and concludes the paper.
2 Problem Formulation
This section provides the mathematical formulation of price discrepancy and the optimal liqui-
dation of defaultable securities under an intensity-based credit risk model. We x a probability
space (
;G;P), where P is the historical measure, and denote T as the maturity of the defaultable
securities. There is a stochastic risk-free interest rate process (rt)0tT . The default arrival is
described by the rst jump of a doubly-stochastic Poisson process. Precisely, assuming a default
intensity process (^t)0tT , we dene the default time d by
d = infft  0 :
Z t
0
^sds > Eg; where E  Exp (1) and E ? ^; r: (2.1)
The associated default counting process is Nt = 1ftdg. We shall work with two ltrations:
the rst one F = (Ft)0tT is generated by r and ^, and the other is the augmented ltration
G = (Gt)0tT dened by Gt = Ft _ (E).
2.1 Price Discrepancy
By standard no-arbitrage pricing theory, the market price of a defaultable claim, denoted by
(Pt)0tT , is computed from a conditional expectation of discounted payo under the market
risk-neutral (or equivalent martingale) pricing measure Q  P. In many parametric credit risk
models, the market pricing measure Q is related to the historical measure P via the default
risk premia (see Section 3.1 below). We assume the standard hypothesis (H) that every F-local
martingale is a G-local martingale holds under Q (see [6, x8.3]).
We can describe a general defaultable claim by the quadruple (Y;A;R; d), where Y 2 FT is
the terminal payo if the defaultable claim survives at T , (At)0tT is a F-adapted continuous
process of nite variation with A0 = 0 representing the promised dividends until maturity or
default, and (Rt)0tT is a F-predictable process representing the recovery payo paid at default.











e  R d^T0 rvdvRd^T 	 <1: (2.2)
For a defaultable claim (Y;A;R; d), the associated cash ow process (Dt)0tT is dened by
















One simple example is the zero-coupon zero-recovery defaultable bond (1; 0; 0; d), whose market







When a perfect replication is unavailable, the market is incomplete and there exist dierent
risk-neutral pricing measures that give dierent no-arbitrage prices for the same defaultable claim.
Mathematically, this amounts to assigning a dierent risk-neutral pricing measure ~Q  Q. The









whose discounted price process (e 
R t
0 rvdv ~Pt)0tT is a ( ~Q;G)-martingale. We assume that the
standard hypothesis (H) also holds under ~Q.
2.2 Optimal Stopping & Delayed Liquidation Premium
A defaultable claim holder can sell her position at the prevailing market price. If she completely
agrees with the market price, then she will be indierent to sell at any time. Under price discrep-
ancy, however, there is a timing option embedded in the optimal liquidation problem. Precisely,
in order to maximize the expected spread between the investor's price and the market price, the
holder solves the optimal stopping problem:






t rvdv(P   ~P )jGt
	
; 0  t  T; (2.6)
where Tt;T is the set of G-stopping times taking values in [t; T ]. Using repeated conditioning, we
decompose (2.6) to Jt = Vt   ~Pt, where









Hence, maximizing the price spread in (2.6) is equivalent to maximizing the expected discounted
future market value P under the investor's measure ~Q in (2.7).
Lemma 2.1. For 0  t  T , we have Vt  Pt _ ~Pt. Also, Vd = ~Pd = Pd at default.
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Proof. Since  = t and  = T are candidate liquidation times, it follows that Vt  Pt _ ~Pt. From





t rvdvdDu = ~Pt for t  d ^ T . This implies that










  R d rvdv ~P jGd	 = ~Pd = Pd : (2.8)
The last equation means that price discrepancy vanishes when the default event is observed or
when the contract expires. This is also realistic since the market will no longer be liquid afterward.
According to (2.7), the optimal liquidation timing directly depends on the investor's pricing
measure ~Q as well as the market Q (via the market price P ). Specically, we observe that the
discounted market price (e 
R t
0 rvdvPt)0tT is a (Q;G)-martingale, but generally not a ( ~Q;G)-
martingale. If the discounted market price is a ( ~Q;G)-supermartingale, then it is optimal to sell
the claim immediately. If the discounted market price turns out to be a (~Q;G)-submartingale,
then it is optimal to delay the liquidation until maturity T . Besides these two scenarios, the
optimal liquidation strategy may be non-trivial.
To quantify the value of optimally waiting to sell, we dene the delayed liquidation premium:
Lt := Vt   Pt  0: (2.9)
It is often more intuitive to study the optimal liquidation timing in terms of the premium L.
Indeed, standard optimal stopping theory [21, Appendix D] suggests that the optimal stopping
time  for (2.7) is the rst time the process V reaches the reward P , namely,
 = infft  u  T : Vu = Pug = infft  u  T : Lu = 0g: (2.10)
The last equation, which follows directly from denition (2.9), implies that the investor will
liquidate as soon as the delayed liquidation premium vanishes. Moreover, we also observe from
(2.8) and (2.10) that   d. Next, we express L as an optimal stopping problem.













where Zt := EQfd~QdQ jGtg is the density process of ~Q with respect to Q.
Proof. Denote the discounted market price by P^u := e
  R u0 rvdvPu. Under measure Q, the product
ZP^ satises the SDE:









d[P^ ; Z]u: (2.12)
By denition and the integrability condition (2.2), both P^ and Z are (Q;G)-martingales. Applying





















In particular, the delayed liquidation premium depends on the product of the pricing kernel
Zu (between ~Q and Q) and the market price Pu. From (2.11), the stochastic bracket [P;Z] plays
a vital role in the analysis of L and . This is especially useful under some parametric credit
risk models where [P;Z] is explicit.
3 Optimal Liquidation under Markovian Credit Risk Models
We proceed to analyze the optimal liquidation problem under a general class of Markovian credit
risk models. The description of various pricing measures will involve the mark-to-market risk pre-
mium and event risk premium, which are crucial in the characterization of the optimal liquidation
strategy (see Theorem 3.4).
3.1 Pricing Measures and Default Risk Premia
We consider a n-dimensional Markovian state vector process X that drives the interest rate
rt = r(t;Xt) and default intensity ^t = ^(t;Xt) for some positive measurable functions r(; ) and
^(; ). Denote by F the ltration generated by X. We also assume a Markovian payo structure
for the defaultable claim (Y;A;R; d) with Y = Y (XT ), At =
R t
0 q(u;Xu)du, and Rt = R(t;Xt)
for some measurable functions Y (), q(; ), and R(; ) satisfying integrability conditions (2.2).




where WP is a m-dimensional P-Brownian motion, a is the deterministic drift function, and  is
the n by m deterministic volatility function. Standard Lipschitz and growth conditions [20, x5.2]
are assumed to guarantee a unique solution to (3.1).
Applying multi-dimensional Girsanov Theorem for the market pricing measure Q  P, there








u du is a m-dimensional Q-
Brownian motion. The process Q;P is commonly referred to as the mark-to-market risk premium
(see [2]), which is assumed herein to be Markovian of the form Q;P(t;Xt). The Q-dynamics of




where b(t;Xt) := a(t;Xt)  (t;Xt)Q;P(t;Xt).
In addition, the holder is subject to the risk from the uncertain timing of default. The
associated event risk premium (see [2, 18]) is dened by the ratio between the Q-intensity and
the P-intensity, namely, (t;Xt) = (t;Xt)=^(t;Xt).
Similarly, the investor's pricing measure ~Q is related to the historical measure P through the
investor's Markovian risk premium functions 
~Q;P(t;x) and ~(t;x). By a change of measure, the
drift of X under ~Q is modied to ~b(t;Xt) := a(t;Xt)  (t;Xt)~Q;P(t;Xt).
Dene MQt = Nt 
R t
0u(1 Nu)du as the compensated (Q;G)-martingale associated with N .




Gt = E   ~Q;Q WQt E  ~MQt ; (3.3)
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We assume that 




u jj2du <1, and
R T
0 j~u uj^udu <1 (see
Theorem 4.8 of [28]). From the decomposition:

~Q;Q
t dt = dW
~Q
t   dWQt = (dW
~Q
t   dWPt )  (dWQt   dWPt ) = (
~Q;P
t   Q;Pt )dt; (3.6)
we can interpret 
~Q;Q as the incremental mark-to-market risk premium assigned by the investor
relative to the market. On the other hand, the discrepancy in event risk premia is accounted for
in the second Doleans-Dade exponential (3.5).




















with constant parameters ^r; ^r; ^; ^  0. Here, ^r, ^ parameterize the speed of mean reversion,
and ^r, ^ represent the long-term means (see [28, x7.1.1]). Assuming a constant event risk





















with constants r; r; ;   0. Under the investor's measure ~Q, the SDEs for rt and ~t = ~^t
are of the same form with parameters ~r; ~r; ~; ~ and ~, and W
Q is replaced by W
~Q.














The upper term is the incremental risk premium for the interest rate while the bottom term
reects the discrepancy in the default risk premia (see (3.6)).
Example 3.2. The CIR Model. Let X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) follow the multifactor CIR model [28, x7.2]:





where W i;P are mutually independent P-Brownian motions and ^i, ^i, i  0, i = 1; : : : ; n
satisfy Feller condition 2^i^i > 
2
i . The interest rate r and historical default intensity ^ are
non-negative linear combinations of Xi with constant weights wri ; w













t : Under measure Q, Xi satises the SDE:





with new mean reversion speed i and long-run mean i.
Under the investor's measure ~Q, the SDE for the state vector is of the same form with new









The event risk premia (; ~) are assigned via t = ^t under Q and ~t = ~^t under ~Q respectively.
Remark 3.3. The current framework can be readily generalized to the situation where the investor
needs to assume an alternative historical measure ~P. The resulting risk premium ~Q;Q will have
a third decomposition component 
~P;P, reecting the dierence in historical dynamics.

















The associated cumulative price is related to the pre-default price via











The price function C(t;x) can be determined by solving the PDE:(
@C
@t
(t;x) + Lb;C(t;x) + (t;x)R(t;x) + q(t;x) = 0; (t;x) 2 [0; T ) Rn;
C(T;x) = Y (x); x 2 Rn;
(3.13)















   r(t;x) + (t;x)f: (3.14)
The computation is similar for the investor's price under ~Q.
3.2 Delayed Liquidation Premium and Optimal Timing
Next, we analyze the optimal liquidation problem V dened in (2.7) for the general defaultable
claim under the current Markovian setting.
Theorem 3.4. For a general defaultable claim (Y;A;R; d) under the Markovian credit risk model,
the delayed liquidation premium admits the probabilistic representation:












where G : [0; T ] Rn 7! R is dened by
G(t;x) =   rxC(t;x)T(t;x)~Q;Q(t;x) +  R(t;x)  C(t;x) ~(t;x)  (t;x)^(t;x): (3.16)
If G(t;x)  0 8(t;x), then it is optimal to delay the liquidation till maturity T .
If G(t;x)  0 8(t;x), then it is optimal to sell immediately.






  1 R(u;Xu)  C(u;Xu)dMQu ;






















Then, (3.15) follows from the standard change of ltration [6, x5.1.1]. If G  0, then the integrand
in (3.15) is positive a.s. and therefore the largest possible stopping time T is optimal. If G  0,
then  = t is optimal and Lt = 0 a.s.
The drift function G has two components explicitly depending on 
~Q;Q and ~   . If

~Q;Q(t;x) = 0 8(t;x), that is, the investor and market agree on the mark-to-market risk pre-
mium, then the sign of G is solely determined by the dierence ~ , since recovery R in general
is less than the pre-default price C. On the other hand, if (t;x) = ~(t;x) 8(t;x), then the
second term of G vanishes but G still depends on  through rxC in the rst term. In the special
example with constant  and r, the rst term of drift function in (3.16) vanishes, but the second
term remains due to potential discrepancy in event risk premium.
When the drift function is not of constant sign, the optimal liquidation policy may be non-
trivial and needs to be numerically determined. For this purpose, we write Lt = 1ft<dgL^(t;Xt),
where L^ is the (Markovian) pre-default delayed liquidation premium dened by


















= 0; (t;x) 2 [0; T ) Rn; (3.18)
where L~b;~ is dened in (3.14), and the terminal condition is L^(T;x) = 0, for x 2 Rn.
The investor's optimal timing is characterized by the sell region S and delay region D, namely,
S = f(t;x) 2 [0; T ] Rn : L^(t;x) = 0g; (3.19)
D = f(t;x) 2 [0; T ] Rn : L^(t;x) > 0g: (3.20)
Also, dene ^ = infft  u  T : L^u = 0g. On f^  dg, liquidation occurs at d since Ld = 0.
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On f^ < dg, ^ is optimal since when u < ^, Lu = 1fu<dgL^u > 0 and L^ = 0. Incorporating
the observation of d, the optimal stopping time is 
 = ^ ^ d.
Given default has not occurred by time t, if it is optimal to liquidate immediately at some
(t;x), then we have L^(t;x) = 0 and G(t;x)  0, which can be veried by substituting L^(t;x) = 0
into (3.18). Hence, as a useful rule of thumb, if G(t;x) > 0 for some (t;x) 2 [0; T ] Rn, then it
is optimal to wait at the current (t;x).
Further, if the defaultable claim is always underpriced by the market, i.e. C(t;x)  ~C(t;x)
8(t;x), then the holder is no better o than delaying liquidation till T . In this case, we observe
that Jt = 0 (see (2.6)) and Lt = 1ft<dg( ~C(t;Xt)   C(t;Xt)). Interestingly, the reverse is also
true. Indeed, the optimality of T as the liquidation time yields the inequality for the defaultable
claim prices: Pt  Vt = ~Pt a.s. for t  T , so the pre-default prices satisfy ~C(t;x)  C(t;x) 8(t;x).
4 Applications to Defaultable Securities
We proceed to illustrate our analysis for a number of defaultable securities, with an emphasis on
how risk premia discrepancy aects the optimal liquidation strategies.
4.1 Defaultable Bonds with Zero Recovery
Consider a defaultable zero-coupon zero-recovery bond with face value 1 and maturity T . By a
change of ltration [6, x5.1.1], the market price of the zero-coupon zero-recovery bond is given by







Qe  R Tt (rv+v)dvjFt	 = 1ft<dgC0(t;Xt); (4.1)
where C0 denotes the market pre-default price that solves (3.13). Under the general Markovian
credit risk model in Section 3.1, we can apply Theorem 3.4 with the quadruple (1; 0; 0; d) to
obtain the corresponding drift function.
Under the OU dynamics in Section 3.1, the pre-default price function C0(t; r; ) is given
explicitly by [28, x7.1.1]:






















As a result, the drift function G0(t; r; ) admits a separable form:
G0(t; r; ) = C0(t; r; )

B(T   t)(~r   r)r +B(T   t)(rr   ~r~r)
+ [D(T   t)(~   )  ( ~

  1)]+ D(T   t)(   ~~)

: (4.4)
We can draw several insights on the liquidation timing from this drift function. If the market
and the investor agree on the specications of interest rate, i.e. r = ~r, and r = ~r, then
G0(t; r; )=C0(t; r; ) is in fact linear in . Furthermore, if the slope D(T   t)(~   )  ( ~   1)
and intercept D(T   t)(  ~~) are of the same sign, then the optimal liquidation strategy
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must be trivial in view of Theorem 3.4. In contrast, if the slope and intercept dier in signs,
the optimal stopping problem may be nontrivial and the sign of the slope determines qualitative
properties of optimal stopping rules. For instance, suppose the slope is positive. We infer that it
is optimal for the holder to wait at high default intensity where the corresponding G0 and thus
delayed liquidation premium are positive. The converse holds if the slope is negative.
If the investor disagrees with market only on event risk premium, i.e.  6= ~, then the drift
function is reduced to G0(t; r; ) =  C0(t; r; )( ~   1), which is of constant sign. This implies
trivial strategies. If  > ~, then G0 > 0 and it is optimal to delay the liquidation until maturity.
On the other hand, if  < ~, then it is optimal to sell immediately. More general specications
of the event risk premium could depend on the state vector and may lead to nontrivial optimal
stopping rules. Disagreement on mean level  has a similar eect to that of .
If the investor disagrees with market only on speed of mean reversion, i.e.  6= ~, then
G0(t; r; ) = C0(t; r; )D(T   t)(~   ) + (   ~) with D(T   t) > 0 before T , where
the slope and intercept dier in signs. If  < ~, the slope ~  is positive and it is optimal to
sell immediately at a low intensity, and thus, a high bond price. The converse holds for  > ~.
We consider a numerical example where the interest rate is constant and the market default
intensity  is chosen as the state vector X with OU dynamics. We employ the standard implicit
PSOR algorithm to solve L^(t; ) through its variational inequality (3.18) over a uniform nite
grid with von Neumann condition applied on the intensity boundary. The market parameters are
T = 1,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 0:015, r = 0:03, and  = 0:02, which are based on the estimates in
[9, 10].
From formula (4.2), we observe a one-to-one correspondence between the market pre-default
bond price C0 and its default intensity  for any xed (t; r), namely,
 =
 log(C0) +A(T   t) B(T   t)r
D(T   t) : (4.5)
Substituting (4.5) into (3.19) and (3.20), we can characterize the sell region and delay region in
terms of the observable pre-default market price C0.
In the left panel of Figure 1, we assume that the investor agrees with the market on all
parameters, but has a higher speed of mean reversion ~ > . In this case, the investor tends
to sell the bond at a high market price, which is consistent with our previous analysis in terms
of drift function. If the bond price starts below 0:958 at time 0, the optimal liquidation strategy
for the investor is to hold and sell the bond as soon as the price hits the optimal boundary. If the
bond price starts above 0:958 at time 0, the optimal liquidation strategy is to sell immediately. In
the opposite case where ~ <  (see Figure 1(right)), the optimal liquidation strategy is reversed
{ it is optimal to sell at a lower boundary. In each cases, the sell region must lie within where G
is non-positive, and the straight line dened by G = 0 can be viewed as a linear approximation
of the optimal liquidation boundary.
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Figure 1: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market pre-default bond price under OU dynamics. We
take T = 1, r = 0:03,  = 0:02,  = ~ = 2, and  = ~ = 0:015. Left panel : When  = 0:2 < 0:3 = ~,
the optimal boundary increases from 0:958 to 1 over time. Right panel : When  = 0:3 > 0:2 = ~, the
optimal boundary increases from 0:927 to 1 over time. The dashed straight line is dened by G = 0, and
we have G  0 in both sell regions.




























































Figure 2: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market pre-default bond price under CIR dynamics.
We take T = 1, r = 0:03,  = 0:07,  = ~ = 2, and  = ~ = 0:015. Left panel : When  = 0:2 < 0:3 = ~,
the optimal boundary increases from 0:948 to 1 over time. Right panel : When  = 0:3 > 0:2 = ~, the
optimal boundary increases from 0:935 to 1 over time.
13





[Bi(T   t)(~i   i)  (~  )wi ]xi +Bi(T   t)(ii   ~i~i)

C0(t;x);
which is again linear in terms of C0(t;x).
To illustrate the optimal liquidation strategy, we consider a numerical example where interest
rate is constant,X=, andw = 1 . The benchmark specications for the market default intensity
 in the CIR dynamics are T = 1,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 0:015, r = 0:03, and  = 0:07 based on
the estimates from [9, 10]. Like in the OU model, we can again express the sell region and delay
region in terms of the pre-default market price C0; see Figure 2.
4.2 Recovery of Treasury and Market Value
Extending the preceding analysis on defaultable bonds, we incorporate two principle ways of
modeling recovery: the recovery of treasury or market value.
By the recovery of treasury, we assume that a recovery of c times the value of the equivalent
default-free bond is paid upon default. Therefore, the market pre-default bond price function is
CRT (t;x) = (1  c)C0(t;x) + c(t;x); (4.9)




t rvdvjXt = x
	
is the equivalent default-free bond price. Then, applying
Theorem 3.4 with the quadruple (1; 0; c; d), we obtain the corresponding drift function:
GRT (t;x) =   rxCRT (t;x)T(t;x)~Q;Q(t;x) + (c  1) ~(t;x)  (t;x)^(t;x)C0(t;x):
(4.10)
If c = 0, then CRT (t;x) = C0(t;x) and GRT in (4.10) reduces to the drift function of the zero-
recovery bond. If c = 1, then CRT (t;x) = (t;x) is the market price of a default-free bond, and
risk premium discrepancy may arise only from the interest rate dynamics.
Here are two examples where the drift function GRT in (4.10) can be computed explicitly.
Example 4.1. Under OU model, CRT (t; r; ) is computed according to (4.9) with C0(t; r; ) in
(4:2) and (t; r; ) = e










dz and B(s) is
dened in (4.3).
Example 4.2. Under the multi-factor CIR model, CRT (t;x) is found again from (4.9), where
C0(t;x) is given in (4:6), and (t;x) is computed from (4:6) with w = 0 in (4:7) and (4:8).
As for the recovery of market value, we assume that at default the recovery is c times the
pre-default value CRMVd  . The market pre-default price is given by






; 0  t  T: (4.11)
The corresponding drift function can be obtained by applying the quadruple (1; 0; cCRMV ; d) to
Theorem 3.4.
Example 4.3. Under the OU model in Section 3.1, the price function CRMV (t; r; ) is given by
CRMV (t; r; ) = eA^(T t) B(T t)r D^(T t);
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Example 4.4. Under the multi-factor CIR model, CRMV (t;x) admits the same formula as (4:6)
but with w replaced by (1  c)w in (4:7) and (4:8).
4.3 Optimal Liquidation of CDS
In this section we consider liquidating a digital CDS position. The protection buyer pays a
premium to the protection seller from time 0 until default or maturity T , whichever is rst, at a
xed rate p specied at contract inception. In return, she receives the payo 1 if default occurs
at or before T . The liquidation of the CDS position at time t can be achieved by entering a
CDS contract as a protection seller with the same credit reference and same maturity T at the
prevailing market spread pmt . After the liquidation, she receives the premium at rate p
m
t and pays
the premium at rate p until default or the maturity T . If default occurs, the default payments





























Here, the rst equality follows from the fact that the market premium rate pmt makes the values
of two legs equal at time t.
Comparing (3.11) and (4.12), we apply the quadruple (0; p; 1; d) to Theorem 3.4 and obtain
the drift function:
GCDS(t;x) =   rxCCDS(t;x)T(t;x)~Q;Q(t;x) +  1  CCDS(t;x) ~(t;x)  (t;x)^(t;x):
(4.13)
If there is no discrepancy over mark-to-market risk premium, i.e. 
~Q;Q(t;x) = 0, then the sign
of GCDS is determined by ~(t;x)  (t;x) since CCDS  1. From this we infer that higher event
risk premium (relative to market) implies delayed liquidation.
In general, the market pre-default value CCDS can be solved by PDE (3.13). If the state vector
X admits OU or CIR dynamics, CCDS , and thus GCDS , is given in closed form, as illustrated in
the following two examples.
Example 4.5. Under the OU dynamics, the pre-default value of CDS is given by the following
integral:












where C0(t; r; ;u) is given by (4:2) with T = u and
g(s; u) :=    r 1  e
 r(u s)
r















iiBi(u  t) +B0i(u  t)xi
  pdu;
where C0(t;x;u) is given in (4:6) with T = u and Bi(s) in (4.8). See Chapter 7 of [28].
Example 4.7. For a forward CDS with start date Ta < T , the protection buyer pays premium
at rate pa from Ta until d or maturity T , and receives 1 if d 2 [Ta; T ]. By direct computation,
the pre-default market value is CCDS(t;x;T ) CCDS(t;x;Ta), t < Ta. Consequently, closed-form
formulas for the drift function are available under OU or CIR dynamics by Examples 4.5 and 4.6.
We consider a numerical example where interest rate is constant and state vector X= follows
the CIR dynamics. We assume that the investor agrees with the market on all parameters except
the speed of mean reversion for default intensity. In the left panel of Figure 3 with  = 0:2 <
0:3 = ~, the optimal liquidation strategy is to sell as soon as the market CDS value reaches an
upper boundary. In the case with  = 0:3 > 0:2 = ~ (see Figure 3 (right)), the sell region is
below the continuation region.















































Figure 3: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market pre-default CDS value under CIR dynamics.
We take T = 1, r = 0:03,  = 0:07, p = 0:02,  = ~ = 2, and  = ~ = 0:015. Left panel : When
 = 0:2 < 0:3 = ~, liquidation occurs at an upper boundary that decreases from 0:0172 to 0 over
t 2 [0; 1]. Right panel : When  = 0:3 > 0:2 = ~, the CDS is liquidated at a lower liquidation boundary,
which decreases from 0:00338 to 0 over time. In both cases, the dashed line dened by G = 0 lies within
the continuation region.
5 Optimal Buying and Selling
Next, we adapt our model to study the optimal buying and selling problem. Consider an investor
whose objective is to maximize the revenue through a buy/sell transaction of a defaultable claim
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(Y;A;R; d) with market price process P in (2.4). The problem is studied separately under two
scenarios, namely, when the short sale of the defaultable claim is permitted or prohibited.
If the investor seeks to purchase a defaultable claim from the market, the optimal purchase
timing problem and the associated delayed purchase premium can be dened as:








; and Lbt := Pt   V bt  0: (5.1)
5.1 Optimal Timing with Short Sale Possibility
When short sale is permitted, there is no restriction on the ordering of purchase time  b and sale
time  s. The investor's investment timing is found from the optimal double-stopping problem:











Since the defaultable claim will mature at T , we interpret the choice of  b = T or  s = T as no
buy/sell transaction at T .


















= Lt + L
b
t : (5.2)
Hence, we have separated U into a sum of the delayed liquidation premium and the delayed
purchase premium. As a result, the optimal sale time  s does not depends on the choice of the
optimal purchase time  b.
The timing decision again depends crucially on the sub/super-martingale properties of dis-
counted market price under measure ~Q. Under the Markovian market model in Section 3, we
can apply Theorem 3.4 to describe the optimal purchase and sale strategies in terms of the drift
function G(t;x) in (3.16).
Proposition 5.1. If G(t;x)  0 8(t;x) 2 [0; T ]  Rn, then it is optimal to immediately buy
the defaultable claim and hold it till maturity T , i.e.  b = t and  s = T are optimal for Ut.
If G(t;x)  0 8(t;x) 2 [0; T ]  Rn, then it is optimal to immediately short sell the claim and
maintain the position till T , i.e.  s = t and  b = T are optimal for Ut.
5.2 Sequential Buying and Selling
Prohibiting the short sale of defaultable claims implies the ordering:  b   s  T . Therefore, the
investor's value function is given by











The dierence Ut   Ut  0 can be viewed as the cost of the short sale constraint to the investor.
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where Zt = EQfd~QdQ jGtg.
Proof. This follows from the same argument for Lemma 2.2, with t and  in (2.12) replaced by
 b and  s respectively.
Under the Markovian market in Section 3, we can apply Lemma 5.2 to deduce the optimal
buy/sell strategy in the extreme cases analogues to Theorem 3.4.
Proposition 5.3. If G(t;x)  0 8(t;x) 2 [0; T ]Rn, then it is optimal to purchase the defaultable
claim immediately and hold until maturity, i.e.  b = t and  s = T are optimal for Ut.
If G(t;x)  0 8(t;x) 2 [0; T ]  Rn, then it is optimal to never purchase the claim, i.e.
 b =  s = T is optimal for Ut.
In fact, the optimal double-stopping problem Ut can be expressed as a sequential optimal
stopping problem. Once the purchase is made, the investor faces a pure liquidation problem
as studied in Section 2.2 (see (2.7)). Therefore, we can rst solve for the optimal sale strategy
(described by a sale boundary), and use it as the input to solve for the optimal purchase timing.
This observation also means that the investor's optimal sale boundary will be the same whether
or not short sale is permitted. However, prior to the purchase, the investor can sell at the desired
sale boundary only if there is no short sale constraint.
In Figure 4, we show a numerical example for a defaultable zero-coupon zero-recovery bond
where interest rate is constant and  follows the CIR dynamics. The investor agrees with the
market on all parameters except the speed of mean reversion for default intensity. When  < ~,
the optimal strategy is to buy as soon as the price enters the purchase region and subsequently sell
at the (higher) optimal liquidation boundary. When  > ~, the optimal liquidation boundary
is below the purchase boundary. However, it is possible that the investor buys at a lower price
and subsequently sells at a higher price since both boundaries are increasing. It is also possible
to buy-high-sell-low, realizing a loss on these sample paths. On average, the optimal sequential
buying and selling strategy enables the investor to prot from the price discrepancy. Finally,
when short sale is allowed, the investor's strategy follows the corresponding boundaries without
the buy-rst/sell-later constraint.
6 Extensions and Conclusions
In this section, we discuss the extensions to a jump-diusion default intensity model as well as a
defaultable equity model.
6.1 Jump-Diusion Default Intensity








t + dJt; (6.1)
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Figure 4: Optimal purchase and liquidation boundaries in the CIR model. The common parameters are
T = 1, r = 0:03,  = 0:07,  = ~ = 2, and  = ~ = 0:015. Left panel : When  = 0:2 < 0:3 = ~,
the short sale constraint moves the purchase boundary higher. Both purchase boundaries, with or without
short sale, are dominated by the liquidation boundary. Right panel : When  = 0:3 > 0:2 = ~, the short
sale constraint moves the purchase boundary lower. The liquidation boundary lies below both purchase
boundaries.
where J is a n-dimensional pure jump process taking values in Rn. Under Q, the Markovian
jump intensity of J is l(t;X0t) and its jump sizes Y1;Y2; : : : are independent and identically
distributed with a common probability density function f(y). Let Ti be the ith jump time of
J and NJt =
P
i1 1fTitg be the the counting process associated with J. Under the investor's
measure ~Q, we replace b with ~b, WQ with W~Q, and denote the ~Q-intensity of J by ~l(t;X0t) and
jump size density by ~f(y).
The two pricing measures Q and ~Q are related by the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
d~Q
dQ
Gt = E   ~Q;Q WQt E  ~MQtKt;


















Consequently, on top of the mark-to-market risk and event risk premia, the investor can potentially
disagree with the market over jump intensity and jump size distribution ofX0, allowing for a richer
structure of price discrepancy as well as the optimal liquidation strategy.
As in Theorem 3.4, we compute the drift function in terms of pre-default price C and default
risk premia, namely,





C(t;x+ y)  C(t;x) ~l(t;x) ~f(y)  l(t;x)f(y)dy; (6.2)
which has a third term arising from J. We observe that the rst two components of GJ share the
same functional form as G in (3.16), though the price function C is derived from the jump-diusion
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model. Even if the investor and the market assign the same mark-to-market risk and event risk
premia, discrepancy over jump intensity and distribution will yield dierent liquidation strategies.
Under quite general ane jump-diusion models, Due et al. [11] provide an analytical treatment
of transform analysis, which can be used for the computation of our drift function.
6.2 Options on a Defaultable Stock
Another useful application is the liquidation of options written on a defaultable equity. Under
the market measure Q, the defaultable stock price S evolves according to
dSt = (rt + t)Stdt+ StdB
Q
t   St dNt; (6.3)
where Nt = 1ftdg is the default counting process, B
Q is a standard Q-Brownian motion inde-
pendent of E andWQ, and rt = r(t;Xt) is driven by X in (3.2). Like in the Markovian credit risk
model in Section 3, we denote under Q (resp. ~Q) the default intensity by (t;Xt) (resp. ~(t;Xt)),
default risk premia by Q;P(t;Xt) and (t;Xt) (resp. 
~Q;P(t;Xt) and ~(t;Xt)). Denote by G the
full ltration generated by X and S. For similar defaultable equity models, we refer to [3, 25],
among others.




Gt = E   ~Q;Q WQt E  ~MQt E    ~Q;QBQt; (6.4)






















~Q;Q is the risk premium for the Brownian motion B driving S. It is related to the event






by the martingale property of the discounted stock price under both Q and ~Q.
Denote the corresponding market price function of option F by




t rvdvF (ST ) jXt = x; St = s
	
: (6.5)
The option holder faces the optimal liquidation problem:






t rvdvP (;X ; S )jXt = x; St = s
	
: (6.6)
In the event f < dg, the option is sold to the market. Otherwise, the value of the holder's






,   d. The delayed liquidation premium,
dened by L := V   P , can be analyzed through a probabilistic representation.
1The holder can lock in this value by shorting F (0) units of the default-free zero-coupon bond with maturity T
at   d, yielding zero payo at T .
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Proposition 6.1. Under the Markovian credit risk model, the delayed liquidation premium for
option F at time t  d is given by







t rvdv G(u;Xu; Su)du jXt = x; St = s
	
; (6.7)
where G : [0; T ] Rn [0;1) 7! R is dened by






(t;x; s) + P (t;x; 0)  P (t;x; s) ~(t;x)  (t;x)^(t;x): (6.8)
If G(t;x; s)  0 8(t;x; s), then it is optimal to delay the liquidation until maturity T .
If G(t;x; s)  0 8(t;x; s), then it is optimal to liquidate the option immediately.
Proof. In view of (6.4) and (6.5), the stochastic bracket between P and Z is given by





  1) P (u;Xu; 0)  P (u;Xu; Su )dMQu ;









  R ut rvdv G(u;Xu; Su)dujGt	;
which yields (6.7) by a change of measure from Q to ~Q.
In the drift function (6.8), the rst component is related to the mark-to-market risk premium

~Q;Q, and the second part depends on the event risk premium and the convexity (or gamma) of the
price P (t;x; s). Indeed, if the gamma Pss(t;x; s)  0, then s@P@s (t;x; s)+P (t;x; 0) P (t;x; s)  0.
If there is no discrepancy over the mark-to-market risk premium, then the optimal stopping rule
is simplied to direct comparison of the event risk premia. In summary,
Corollary 6.2. Suppose that the option price function s 7! P (t;x; s) is convex and ~Q;Q(t;x) = 0
for every (t;x) 2 [0; T ]  Rn. If ~(t;x)  (t;x) (resp. ~(t;x)  (t;x)) 8(t;x), then  = T
(resp.  = t) is optimal for Lt.
Corollary 6.2 can be applied to European call and put options. Interestingly, we observe the
following Put-Call parity in terms of optimal liquidation timing.
Proposition 6.3. Suppose the interest rate is deterministic. The investor's optimal strategies
for selling a European Call and for selling a European Put, with the same underlying S, strike
and maturity, are identical.
Proof. Denote the interest rate function by r() and the call and put price functions by PCall(t;x; s)
and PPut(t;x; s), with terminal payos (ST   K)+ and (K   ST )+ respectively. Applying the
Put-Call parity and that (e 
R u














































In summary, we have provided a exible mathematical model for the optimal liquidation of various
credit derivatives under price discrepancy. We have identied the situations where the optimal
timing is trivial and also solved for the cases when sophisticated strategies are involved. The
optimal liquidation framework enables investors to quantify their views on default risk, extract
prot from price discrepancy, and perform more eective risk management. Our model can also
be modied and extended to incorporate single or multiple buying and selling decisions.
For future research, a natural direction is to consider the investment timing problem under
other default risk models. Also, liquidation problems are important for multi-name credit deriva-
tives or a portfolio of derivatives in general. To this end, the structure of dependency between
multiple risk factors is crucial in modeling price dynamics. Finally, ecient and robust calibration
methods are challenging but also essential.
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